By
David Nicholls
Executive
Director, Submarine Institute of Australia
Australian
submarine programs have always been managed under stringent security
requirements which protect all information and technical data; the future
submarine program is no different.
There
are many more aspects of military information that are sensitive than are not.
There is a broad spectrum of sensitivities which must be protected; few have
greater importance than those associated with submarines. This is because
submarines are critical strategic platforms in the execution of national
security. If any of their capabilities are compromised, their effectiveness is
diminished. Therefore, the protection of sensitive information by those who
design, build and operate submarines is of paramount importance. National
patriotism is a strong factor and, when combined with the professional
motivation of serving in an elite and highly-effective submarine force, it
produces an almost religious zeal in protecting knowledge of the capability
from those whose motivations are not consistent with Australia’s national
interests. It also explains why the Australian Government requires people
involved in submarine technology and operations to have a very high level of
security clearance. The awarding of these clearances involves careful
examination of the subjects’ susceptibility to weaknesses of human character
together with questionable affiliations (those who don’t pass this scrutiny are
excluded).
There
have, however, been occasions when financial gain, political disaffection or
blackmail may have resulted in the compromise of submarine information
security. The penalties for anyone convicted of compromise are severe and
should serve as a significant deterrent. There is a possibility that the recent
leak of sensitive information about new Indian Scorpene submarines came as a
result of these motives. The invariable reaction is a deep investigation to
identify if laws have been broken and if they have, recommendations about
prosecution. Given the Australian Government’s strong, ongoing commitment to
the management of sensitive defence information, this is the likely course of
action taken by the Australian Government (and French Government), as well as
defence industry stakeholders directly involved with the Scorpene leak.
Threats
from cyber-attacks are increasing, exploiting both technology and procedure
weaknesses. Hi-tech solutions,
such as encryption, and low-tech precautions, such as physically transporting
information instead of communication using the internet, will continue to be
pursued to keep Australian information safe. Despite this, those involved in
submarine security will never be complacent.
Australian
security protocols have been applied successfully for decades during the
procurement, build and operational profile of the Oberon and Collins classes submarines.
The SIA has confidence that the recently published security lapse will serve to
ensure the security protocols around the future submarines are just as tight,
if not tighter.
