Realistic planning for future nuclear propulsion of Australia’s submarines

By Nautilus

Recent public debate about nuclear propulsion for submarines has been notable for the polarised viewpoints on the issue.

On the one hand, the strategic advantages of nuclear propulsion for submarines have been acknowledged, while on the other, the lack of experience within Australia of nuclear power for civil or naval use demands a deliberate program to move up the learning curve. It will take at least a decade to meet community expectations for internationally-recognised regulatory standards for safety, security, efficiency and sustainability.

The first challenge is to contemplate nuclear energy as a beneficial adjunct to renewable energy generation and advanced storage that is the ultimate goal of an emissions-free electrical power generation network.

What are more likely to be accepted are small, road-portable modular reactors based on proven pressurised water cooling, which is, coincidentally, the norm for naval propulsion. The attractive feature of small, modular reactors is their size and mass is small enough to be easily transportable so they can be constructed and fuelled remotely from their operating sites and after many years of effective operation, they can then be removed in the same way for safe decommissioning in a similar remote site.

The connection between nuclear power stations and trained naval operating personnel has been recognised in other countries such that the education and training of operators and maintainers of naval nuclear reactors are readily transitioned to civil reactor operations after their naval service. This is even more the case when the civil reactors use the same pressurised-water-reactor technology, as is the case with most small modular reactor programs.

For Australia, there is a critical national need for energy security and this is sufficient to justify contingency planning, such as the installation of a single small modular reactor at Lucas Heights in southern Sydney for familiarisation, research and development, and for the education and training of civil and naval professional staff for operation and maintenance of such reactors. This would help to build the foundation workforce for this industry.

Only then could Australia realistically consider the next generation of submarines beyond the current acquisition program for the future submarines, which will itself have many challenges in energy generation, conversion and storage. The design of the Shortfin Barracuda, now underway, will address air-independent propulsion in one form or another and, also, the related issue of energy density in battery technologies. This research and development is already time-constrained. Random thoughts of nuclear propulsion should never be permitted to raise the risk of a capability gap arising from resulting delays occurring in the Future Submarine Program (FSP).

Beyond the urgency of the FSP, there is sound argument to plan for the transition to the greater performance and availability of nuclear propulsion, but this needs a research and development program in its own right and a concerted program to build up the scientific, engineering and operational workforce.

We can reasonably expect support from our allies and business partners in the US, UK or France, but ultimately, Australia needs to set and meet our own demanding standards for safety, security, efficiency and sustainability. This will take significant time – even if we start immediately – as the Submarine Institute of Australia believes we should.

Given the time it would take for serious consideration of nuclear propulsion of the next generation of Australian submarines – after we have an effective future submarine force at sea – and to garner the experience and conduct the workforce development which is essential, the process should start now.

Growing up to deliver submarines

By Christopher Skinner

Executive Committee Member, Submarine Institute of Australia

The following advertisement appeared recently soliciting applications for positions in the Australian Government’s Department of Defence Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group SEA1000 Future Submarine Program. To my surprise, it has evoked several indignant or agitated questions from colleagues and others with long engagement in submarine matters (see http://sea1000.gov.au/employment/):

“Individuals can apply for positions under direct hire contracts by the Commonwealth of Australia or through companies with authority to provide staff to Australia in support of defence programs. Contracts can vary from 3 to 7 years.

Up to 60 personnel will be recruited within the next 12 months as design of the Future Submarine progresses. Individuals with proven skills and appropriate experience in submarine design, submarine systems design and submarine program management including business management are required for key roles located in Canberra and Adelaide (Australia) and Cherbourg (France).

These people will be working as members of the Future Submarine Program Office, supporting the Commonwealth in upholding its role as an intelligent partner with DCNS and Lockheed Martin Australia.

Positions available range from senior technical positions to mid-level roles. All positions will include a requirement to mentor and train our Australian workforce. Priority has been placed on the selection of personnel for senior positions including:

• Technical Director (Platform) – Adelaide (click here for position description)
• Assistant Technical Director (Platform) – Cherbourg (click here for position description)
• Technical Director (Combat System) – Adelaide (click here for position description)
• Assistant Technical Director (Combat System) – Cherbourg (click here for position description)
• Test and Evaluation Director – Adelaide (click here for position description)
• Material and Supplier Base Director – Adelaide (click here for position description)
• Shipyard Infrastructure/Workforce Director – Adelaide (click here for position description)

Potential applicants will need to demonstrate substantial management experience at a senior level gained in a technologically and commercially demanding environment – preferable the submarine industry.

Mandatory: Applicants must meet requisite attributes for the position for which they apply.

Interviews will begin the week of 9 January 2017 at the Australian Embassy in the US and within Australia thereafter. Applications or queries should be forwarded to submarine.mobilisation@defence.gov.au.”

To me, this all seems logical and timely to ensure the Australian Government is well staffed to perform its proper role effectively and to engage with the main contractors DCNS (platform integration) and Lockheed Martin Australia (LMA, combat system integration). The only further positions that might be added to the above list would be someone placed in the US to support the AN/BYG-1 combat management system, Mk 48 wire-guided torpedo, both jointly developed by the US and Australia, and other US-sourced programs relevant to the Future Submarine Program, as well as a deputy director technical with responsibility for propulsion systems integration, a non-trivial task, within the overall platform integration role.

The role of these people will be as leaders of the Commonwealth teams that form the customer group with whom industry works on a daily basis. These people will be delegated authority to approve documents and specifications on behalf of the customer (the Australian Government’s Department of Defence Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group). This is part of the design development process which has a great deal to be accomplished before procurement of services and materials begins – even long lead items – or construction and integration can begin.

Some of the objections raised relate to the first interviews taking place in Washington DC before those in Australia. Frankly, I do understand this would surprise many people who have not experienced the intensity and richness of scientific, technological, engineering and commercial talent that is concentrated in the Washington area, especially the United States Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in Crystal City and nearby.

I have surmised that the interviews in Washington DC are to try to attract US-experienced personnel to join the program. They will provide best-practice experience based on the USS Virginia-class submarines and other programs. However, comments from colleagues have included:

“There is an underlying question about Australian industry involvement. I thought we were to build some Australian sovereign capability with Australian industry. Are we to create an Australian NAVSEA as custodian of some submarine knowledge, disconnected from Australian industry? We now learn that RAND Corp has been tasked by the Government to develop yet another paper on lessons learned in building up and sustaining a workforce for the Australian shipbuilding industry. A US corporation to advise on the Collins, ANZAC and Huon experiences, and the availability and training of Australian managers, engineers, draftspersons, electricians, welders, fitters-and-turners, shipwrights, etc for the Royal Australian Navy’s future submarine and shipbuilding programs? When does Australia shed its colonial past and stop asking Washington, London, and now also Paris, for direction and instead start believing in its own considerable track record and capacities – not least its human resources? The last time a US designer had to build a manned platform that had to pay the electricity bills was circa 1956 and the last operator that swiped the credit card was BLUEBACK circa 1990. While I note the UUV kiddies now have taken up that ‘pay-the-bill’ challenge, they are a very different crowd to those working the ‘SSN meat-grinder’. So it is almost three generations since somebody designed a fighting boat for non-nuke ops in the US and just a generation since somebody put on a snort.”

My instant response to these concerns is that what NAVSEA would bring to this highly challenging program is the process for managing it, not the design itself, which will be the responsibility of DCNS primarily, a highly-experienced designer of submarines – nuclear and conventional – and on air-independent propulsion for the latter.

I, therefore, reject the doubts on the suitability of NAVSEA people to contribute effective leadership and management to the program. I also reject the suggestions that this overlooks highly qualified and experienced Australian professionals; they will be in great demand, but very short supply for a program of this magnitude.

To illustrate how far we have to travel up the industrial-capability curve, Australia’s only school of naval architecture was closed recently (according to media reports in December).

We must learn from our past experience of major naval programs – good and bad – and apply all those lessons in collaboration with experienced designers, builders, integrators and sustainment people from where we can attract them. This is an extraordinary program to meet requirements that cannot be met off the shelf so that alone should attract innovative people from around the world.

I truly hope we concentrate on growing our scientific, engineering and industrial experience to deliver highly effective submarines in a program which becomes an exemplar for Australian and international endeavours of similar complexity.